Social choice theory provides an elegant way of analyzing how groups of people should and do make collective decisions. It takes a collection of people with well-defined and heterogeneous preferences as an input and then examines the different ways in which we can construct a group preference from these inputs.
The construction is achieved through the use of a preference aggregation rule which could be equivalent to a voting rule or something else entirely. The goal of the workshop is to examine the properties of different types of rules, and to characterize rules that yield desirable group outcomes. An interest in analytic reasoning is required, but no prior knowledge of social choice theory or of mathematics is presupposed. Technical ideas will be presented in an introductory and pedagogical way, suitable for anyone who enjoys logical thinking.
This course gives an introduction to social choice theory and related debates in the theory of democracy. While all students are required to understand the implications of the main social-choice-theoretic results, they can approach these either from a more formal perspective or from a more normative perspective and make philosophical aspects of democratic theory their main focus. Introduction: Constitutional choices.
Voters as a "committee". A "committee"of politicians. Elections as methods of belief aggregation.
Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 19
Electoral risk-taking and economic or political quandaries. Part 4: Welfare, Justice and Poverty. Social welfare functionals and related concepts. Axioms and their use. Independence and invariance-based characterizations.
Application of Fuzzy Logic to Social Choice Theory
Disgarding neutrality or invariance. Utilitarianism and the Theory of Justice C. Blackorby, W. Bossert, D. Social-evaluation functionals. Generalized utilitarianism. Variable-population extensions. Inequality, Poverty and Welfare B. Measurement of inequality.
Measurement of poverty.
The Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare presents, in two volumes, essays on past and on-going work in social choice theory and welfare economics. The first volume consists of four parts.
In Part 1 Arrovian Impossibility Theorems , various aspects of Arrovian general impossibility theorems, illustrated by the simple majority cycle first identified by Condorcet, are expounded and evaluated. It also provides a critical survey of the work on different escape routes from impossibility results of this kind. In Part 2 Voting Schemes and Mechanisms , the operation and performance of voting schemes and cost-sharing mechanisms are examined axiomatically, and some aspects of the modern theory of incentives and mechanism design are expounded and surveyed. In Part 3 structure of social choice rules , the positional rules of collective decision-making the origin of which can be traced back to a seminal proposal by Borda , the game-theoretic aspects of voting in committees, and the implications of making use of interpersonal comparisons of welfare with or without cardinal measurability are expounded, and the status of utilitarianism as a theory of justice is critically examined.
It also provides an analytical survey of the foundations of measurement of inequality and poverty. In order to place these broad issues as well as further issues to be discussed in the second volume of the Handbook in perspective, Kotaro Suzumura has written an extensive introduction, discussing the historical background of social choice theory, the vistas opened by Arrow's Social Choice and Individual Values , the famous "socialist planning" controversy, and the theoretical and practical significance of social choice theory. The primary purpose of this Handbook is to provide an accessible introduction to the current state of the art in social choice theory and welfare economics.
Social Choice Theory
The expounded theory has a strong and constructive message for pursuing human well-being and facilitating collective decision-making. Offers consolidated reviews and analyses of scholarship in a framework that encourages synthesis. Graduate students and professors worldwide working in all subdisciplines of economics and finance.
Each chapter is written by a well-cast expert in the area.
Suzumura also summarizes the main lines of ongoing and future research. To date, he is the youngest person to have received this award, at In economics, he is a figure in post-World War II neo-classical economic theory. Many of his former graduate students have gone on to win the Nobel Memorial Prize themselves.
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His most significant works are his contributions to social choice theory, notably "Arrow's impossibility theorem", and his work on general equilibrium analysis. He has also provided foundational work in many other areas of economics, including endogenous growth theory and the economics of information.
He has been co-editor of the Handbooks in Economics series since the mids. We are always looking for ways to improve customer experience on Elsevier. We would like to ask you for a moment of your time to fill in a short questionnaire, at the end of your visit. If you decide to participate, a new browser tab will open so you can complete the survey after you have completed your visit to this website.
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